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1. RAZO 
 
Sordello is concerned to tell us that we need to be careful with 
praise.  In  a  short  poem,  he  addresses  first  Peire  Guillem  (with 
whom he engages in a tenso elsewhere) and then Milady—his lady—
of Foix to warn against too much praise, immoderate praise, praise 
of  what  is  fundamentally  unpraiseworthy.  James  J.  Wilhelm 
translates the poem like this: 
 
Lai a.n Peire Guillem man ses bistenza, 
q.ancar non a de lauzar pro apres; 
q’anc mais non vim lauzor qe pro tengues 
si.l laus passet del lauzat sa valenza; 
qe trop lauzar destriga la lauzor 
del trop lauzat e blasma.l lauzador 
lai on vertatz repren sa conoissenza. 
 
A madompna de Fois man per sa honor 
qe no.l plassa desmesur’en lauzor, 
qe trop lauzar es blasmes e faillenza. 
 
[Over to Peire Guillem I’m hastily sending word 
Because he hasn’t learned enough about praising; 
For never have we seen a praise that you can call good 
If the words surpass the value of the praised one; 
For excessive praising vitiates the praise 
Of the overpraised one and lays blame upon the praiser 
In places where truth reproves its awareness. 
 
To Milady of Foix I suggest for her honor 
That she shouldn’t welcome excess in any praise, GLOSSATOR 4 
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Because excessive praise makes blame and error.]
1 
 
The poem  begins  with  a  direction,  a  trajectory:  “over  to  Peire 
Guillem,” the poem is thrown, sent, launched, invoking delay or 
hesitation—“bistenza”—only  to  say  it  away.  No  delay:  Sordello 
sends his song to Guillem, and he sends it for a reason. Notice the 
explanatory “qe,” repeated at the beginning of five of the poem’s 
ten lines. Then notice something else: Guillem has, Sordello says, 
“not  yet  [ancar]  learned  enough  [pro]  about  praising,”  but  no 
sooner have those two qualifiers appeared—yet, enough—than they 
echo, distorted, in the subsequent line: “ancar” truncated as “anc,” 
“pro”  redoubled  this  time  in  a  more  explicitly  affirmative  vein, 
which  Wilhelm—who,  come  to  think  of  it,  sounds  a  lot  like 
Guillem—renders  as  “good.”  Good,  enough.  But  enough  praise, 
good praise, or enough knowledge of good praise requires a kind 
of equivalence of praise to its object: the “valenza” of the former 
must not exceed, must not pass or trespass, the latter. For too much 
praise  impedes,  precisely,  praise:  Wilhelm  says  vitiates,  but 
Antonio  Petrossi  translates  the  verb  as  “ritardare,  impedire,”  to 
delay  or  impede,  and  characterizes  it  as  a  “typical  verb  of  the 
troubadours’ love language that subtends in its semantic structure . 
.  .  a  continual  state  of  tension  and  restlessness  and  a  sorrow 
incapable  of  attaining  its  own  manifestation”  [tipico  verbo  del 
linguaggio amoroso dei trovatori che sottende nella sua struttura 
semantica . . . uno stato continuo di tensione e di inquietudine e un 
dolore  incapace  di  raggiungere  una  sua  manifestazione].
2  Too 
much  praise,  in  other  words,  would  seem  to  create  a 
phenomenological impasse: if praise is in excess to its object —but 
how would this excess be measured, and by whose criteria?—then 
this interferes with the very manifestation of praise. Praise becomes 
no longer recognizable as such. Not only does praise stop looking 
like itself—how do we know what it looked like in the first place?—
but the agent of praise becomes the patient of blame. The work of 
destrigar,  the  unworking  of  excessive  praise,  praise-lag,  in  effect 
makes  the  erstwhile  praiser  inextricable  from  his  (or,  we’ll  see 
shortly,  her)  object.  Where  there  is  too  much  praise,  there  is 
                                                                                                 
1  James  J.  Wilhelm,  ed.  and  trans.,  The  Poetry  of  Sordello  (New  York: 
Garland, 1987), pp. 138-9. 
2  Antonio  Petrossi,  Le  coblas  esparsas  occitane  anonime.  Doctoral  thesis 
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enough blame to go around, at least “there”—a “lai” that repeats the 
initial word of the poem—where “truth reproves its awareness” or, 
I’d prefer, truth literally regains consciousness. As if truth had been 
knocked out by praise’s surplus, knocked flat, knocked cold, and 
only now, hesitantly, groggily, were reemerging to reestablish some 
much-needed distinctions: between praise and blame; between too 
much  and  enough;  between  subjects  and  objects,  agents  and 
patients.  
Moreover, at the heart of this first stanza, there is something 
like an anagram, a rearrangement of sounds and senses that once 
again calls into question or puts on display what it would mean to 
extricate,  once  and  for  all,  something  like  a  message  from  this 
poem;  or  something  like  oneself:  “lauzor  qe  pro  tengues,”  the 
praise that I—Sordello, Cary, I—hold to be enough, or good enough, 
enfolds  itself  into  the  declaration,  the  less  positional,  less 
perspectival assertion in line five “qe trop lauzar destriga,” that too 
much  praise  impedes,  implicates.  Swap  a  couple  of  consonants, 
scramble the letters, think of how “pro”—enough—might write itself 
into  “trop”—too  much—and  try  to  find  your  way  out  of  the  fold 
between what I hold to be the case and what “praise,” or really “to 
praise,” holds up. Find your way out of that fold—find your way, 
perhaps, all the way to Guillem, wherever he is—and you might 
find yourself taking something back.  
Or  sending  it  again:  the  second  stanza—is  it  even  really  a 
stanza?—sends  for,  and  to,  someone  else,  Madompna  de  Fois, 
Milady of Foix, substituting a lady for a priest, a woman for a man, 
or  adding  each  to  the  other,  but  this  time  honor  is  at  stake,  a 
reputation more than, say, a given content of knowledge, and the 
subjunctive  in  the  second  line  suggests  the  shift  in  tone:  may 
immoderation in praise not please her. It is not, in other words, 
that  “desmesur”  (the  ecstatic  opposite  of  courtly  moderation) 
emphatically  and  objectively  does  not  please;  it  is  that  it  ought 
not—please may it not—please. Where “trop lauzar” introduced, in 
the  first  stanza,  an  inextricable  phenomenal  impediment,  a 
phenomenological trick, and made praise into something else, or at 
least  made  it—and,  with  it,  the  speaker  or  subject  or  agent  of 
praise—appear to be something else, here, instead or in addition, 
there is no “destrigar” but, rather, an apparently plain statement of 
being:  too  much  praise  does  not  “make”  anything,  despite 
Wilhelm’s  translation,  but—to  my  attentive  but  untrained  eye—is, 
“es,” blame and failure, fault, default, lack. Too much praise is two GLOSSATOR 4 
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things. What is more—what is too much—one of those two things, 
blame, is what praise has become already, in its excessive failure to 
appear as praise, and the other of those two things is an almost 
impossible word: it is the word for failure but also—this is still, for 
one more word, a poem about words—the failure of a word, the 
failure of one word too many.  
“Faillenza” defaults, fails to mean much of anything. Is this 
failure—I cannot ask this enough, no matter what Sordello might 
say—the feminine mode of the phenomenal inextrication of praise 
and blame in the first stanza? Where Guillem needs to learn that 
too much praise, in his hands or out of his mouth, will keep praise 
from appearing as such—will, in other words, amount to a crisis in 
the disclosure of truth, in the truth-value of speaking as a form of 
appearing,  of  becoming-recognizable—Milady  of  Foix  faces  a 
different  problem,  a  problem  of  failure  and  pleasure,  of  the 
possible  pleasures  of  immoderate  praise  and  the  kinds  of 
shortcomings, the kinds of falling-short, that they might lead to or, 
in fact, ultimately, be. (My faux-philosophical shorthand for this: 
what Heidegger is to Guillem, Foucault is to Milady.) What could 
be pleasurable about immoderate praise, praise beyond measure 
that would nonetheless literally be immeasure, unmeasure, within 
praise?  “Desmesur’en  lauzor”  presents  this  embeddedness 
acoustically, in its sibilance—des / mes / lauz—and its purring—sur / 
zor—as almost an invitation to hear something wild lurking within 
the very cadences of praise, the very phonic tissue of the word 
itself (although, after the first stanza, it is not easy to say what that 
word “itself” would be, how praise, conceptually or lexically, could 
ever cohere “enough”). There is something shockingly pleasurable 
about  rolling  this  word  and  its  variants—the  poem  also  says 
“lauzar,” “lauzat,” “lauzador”—around in your mouth, or in mine. 
There’s a trick to it: even as it intensifies the sensory content—the 
sound, the buzz, the taste—of these variations on praise, repeating 
them also empties them of something, of something like meaning 
(although nothing like sense), speaks a kind of gorgeous failure at 
their heart and in their liquid, hissing cores. 
 
 
2. SIRVENTES 
 
Gorgeous is a praise word. It is evaluative (like beautiful) but it is 
also  emphatic  (like  gross).  It  is,  additionally,  the  object  of  a HOWIE – INEXTRICABLE 
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terrifying pun in the city where I live. It plays tricks on you, tricks 
that Sordello would  recognize: when I say,  “That’s gorgeous,” I 
unfocus something in my powers of observation and expression; I 
don’t  say,  for  example,  that  gorgeousness  is  the  effect  of  a 
particular  quantity  of  a  particular  color,  weight,  and  texture  of 
fabric draped at a particular angle from a particular part of your 
body—gorge or not—but I say, instead, that in place of this minute 
catalog I am substituting a more general affirmation. This kind of 
affirmation—call it praise—does something less and more and other 
than what mere, or meticulous, description would do. It becomes 
easy, in the universe of the gorgeous, in the universe of praise, to 
unhook this insistence—I affirm you—from what, or who, it insists 
upon.  There  is  a  distinct—or,  better,  a  difficult  to  distinguish—
pleasure to this unhooking. You go all gauzy in your gorgeousness. 
Suddenly  my  best  academic  diction  fades  into  the  crumbly, 
crooning consonants of Judy Garland at Carnegie Hall, late in the 
show. Do it again, praise says. But praise doesn’t stop there. This is 
part of its problem: praise doesn’t stop at all, particularly inasmuch 
as  it  is  not,  for  Milday  of  Foix,  “praise”  so  much  as  “praising,” 
“lauzar”  rather  than  “lauzor.”  (But  who,  really,  can  successfully 
keep  those  vowels  straight?)  There  is  an  infinity  to  praise:  the 
possibility, however distant, that it will just keep on, that the thing 
or person praised (the poem, the body, you) will disappear behind 
that screen of sibilance; that it will start to seem as though praise 
and blame are equivalent—tricked out in one another—because it 
will no longer be clear what they are about. Their object will have 
become unrecognizable, in the terms of the first stanza: truth will 
have failed to come to consciousness; manifestation—the becoming-
apparent of this praiseworthy body (again, why not, you)—will have 
tripped over itself, failed to happen, broken its own knees. 
This is why it is important to think and speak about praise: we 
need  knees;  we  also  need  practices  of  affirmation.  We  need 
“desmesur”—we need it now more than ever—but we need to know 
its cost, the risks we take with truth, with truthful appearing, when 
praise is the language we choose to speak. It is not that praise and 
truth are opposed to one another; in fact, where truth could easily 
be  misunderstood  as  an  uncomplicated  appearing—think  of  the 
juridical  invocation  of  the  whole  truth  and  nothing  but—so  too 
could praise summon the fantasy of a desirable lack of complexity. 
You’re  gorgeous  would  be  a  nice  way  not  to  say  better,  more 
particular, more adequate and attentive and, even, affirming things GLOSSATOR 4 
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about  you.  We’ve  already  seen  that  part  of  the  problem  with 
praise, for Sordello, is its flirtation with—its enactment of—destrigar, 
the trick of it, the enfoldedness or, let me come out and say it, the 
complication  of praise with blame  when value—and with it truth—
leaves the building. What we need (and I insist on this rhetoric of 
need because of the poem’s closing “faillenza”) is an account of 
how the complications of praise may be thought, said, and sung 
together with the complications of truth and, yes, pleasure. 
Such  complications  would,  first  of  all,  appear  to  implicate 
Peire  Guillem:  the  place  where  truth  takes  back  or  reprises  its 
awareness, the place where truth comes or comes to, is structurally 
and lexically analogous to the place where Guillem is, where the 
poem is initially sent: “lai on,” “lai a.n.” Truth’s place—the place of 
its becoming-manifest—is, I would wager, a singular place, and a 
personal one: it is shot through with particular lives, with particular 
forms  of  being  and  speaking,  with  particular  destinations  and 
destinies  (insofar  as  these  latter  are  understood,  anagramatically 
and metonymically, as densities, too). To complicate means to fold 
something  with  something  else:  in  this  poem’s  account  of 
complication, not only is the object of praise folded—wrapped up, 
quilted,  woven—with  its  (or  his  or  her)  subject;  not  only  is  the 
practice  of  praise  folded  together  with  that  of  blame;  but, 
interleaved  with  these,  the  place  of  courtly  or  philosophical 
abstraction—the place of truth—is folded together with the place of a 
proper  name.  For  Catherine  Keller,  complication  is  a  way  of 
expressing, after Nicholas of Cusa (writing two hundred or so years 
after Sordello), the “folding together of all bodies in the infinite,” 
which is “explicated in the finite bodies of the world.”
3 Within the 
universe of this small poem, complication would seem to name the 
gathering up of praise and blame, subject and object, agent and 
patient,  commonplaces  and  proper  places,  the  personal  and  the 
impersonal,  ladies  and  priests,  in  an  economy  whose  principle 
would seem to be that nothing is absolutely distinct; indeed, that 
this lack of absolute distinction could itself be cause for pleasure. In 
contrast  to  (or,  better,  alongside  and  within)  this  practice  of 
complication,  explication  would  insist  that  everything  is  only 
absolutely (rather than relatively) distinct, only distinct insofar as the 
                                                                                                 
3  Catherine  Keller,  “The  Cloud  of  the  Impossible:  Embodiment  and 
Apophasis,” in Chris Boesel and Catherine Keller, eds., Apophatic Bodies 
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horizon of this distinction is nothing less than infinite, nothing less 
than absolute. Explication—even the ordinary work of explication 
we call reading a poem—opens the complicated truth of our lives 
and our speech, that receding horizon, that fainting spell, out into 
the world. Explication calls a spade a spade (and not, for example, 
a priest), even as it does not entirely forget the ground from which 
this call issues.  
Karmen MacKendrick puts it this way: 
 
Open  again,  we  are  pulled  back  to  the  before  of 
memory, to the fire of joyful desiring—not in finding a 
missing piece of ourselves, but in losing the tidiness of 
individuation. And returned to ourselves from and even 
alongside  our  own  absence,  we  are  complicated, 
enfolding  within  our  selves  perpetual  reminders  of 
forgetfulness . . . 
4 
 
Praise’s potential for “desmesur” lies in the threat it poses to “the 
tidiness of individuation,” even as it insists on naming its individual 
destination  or  destinatario.  Enough  praise  can  easily  become  too 
much because the very criteria for distinguishing enough from too 
much fade, or fold, or flame, into the porous ground of a  truth 
whose becoming-disclosed does not obey the demand for haste or 
clarity or convention. Praise is forgetful—it forgets, momentarily at 
least, the context that would make an affirmation into something 
quantifiable, something relative to other affirmations—and, thereby, 
remembers  the  absence,  the  “faillenza,”  that  propels  it  forward, 
that launches it over to Guillem or Milady or wherever it’s going, 
that makes it possible to speak at all. Other kinds of speaking don’t 
necessarily  remember  their  absences  quite  so  effectively:  the 
sophistication of a different kind of idiom—call it a critical idiom—
might miss the fact that it’s missing something. Praise, like love, 
never forgets that it’s missing something, never forgets that it is by 
definition forgetful. You’re gorgeous: when did I last say that? When 
did I last see you? I can’t remember. But you’re here, and so am I, 
and it feels good to say so, and for this last little sentence please let 
me forget that we won’t be here much longer.  
 
                                                                                                 
4 Karmen MacKendrick, Fragmentation and Memory (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2008), p. 54. GLOSSATOR 4 
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3. TENSO 
 
Before  I  forget,  let  me  acknowledge  (let  me  allow  to  become 
recognizable)  something  else:  that  there’s  a  difference,  a 
specifically  political  difference,  between  praising  something 
generally  acknowledged  as  praiseworthy  and  praising  something 
generally taken to be unworthy of praise. (Like Sordello’s poem, 
most  of  our  more  modern  practices  of  praise  proceed  from  the 
conviction that the “lauzat” has a certain “valenza.”) If part of the 
social  work  of  praise  is  its  construction  of  something  like  a 
momentary community of affirmation, then part of its social work, 
a less pleasant part of its social work, is the shorthand that praise 
becomes for reinforcing canons—of beauty, taste, style—that are also 
ways not just of testifying to the power of things in the world but of 
using that power on or against others. If my reputation will only be 
enhanced by praising you, that is one thing; if, by praising you, I 
put my reputation—or my job, or my life—on the line, then praise is 
not  necessarily  a  different  thing  but  a  more  complicated  thing. 
Similarly, if someone blames what I praise—if what I praise is taken 
or mistaken as blameworthy—then some kind of crisis occurs not 
just socially—we find we can’t agree—but phenomenally: the very 
body I want to bring to light, the very truth I want to allow to 
become  visible,  becomes  blocked  not,  this  time,  by  the 
compromised, complicated structure of praise itself but by your—or 
someone  else’s—unwillingness  to  participate  in,  to  consent  to,  its 
disclosure. (When this blockage occurs in relation to bodies that 
have been historically and systematically all too blocked, all too 
invisible, it is impossible to ignore the political implications, and 
complications, of praise.) Part of the “faillenza” of praise, part of its 
failure and, I’d add, its fallenness, is that these kinds of fall-outs 
happen:  I  refuse  to  recognize  the  praiseworthiness  of  an  object 
you’ve  chosen—often  I  might  do  this  in  absent,  forgetful  ways 
rather  than  dramatically  intentional  ones—or  you  refuse,  or  just 
plain  fail,  to  recognize  the  “valenza”  of  what  I’ve  praised.  The 
stakes  will  be  higher,  or  lower,  depending  on  whether  you  are 
more  or  less  powerful  than  I  am,  but,  whatever  the  stakes,  the 
politics of praise will be complicated: shot through—bang—with our 
blindness to one another, with our forgetfulness of the world and of 
ourselves, even as we reach back out to that world, even as we 
continue—how could we not?—to affirm. HOWIE – INEXTRICABLE 
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In  the  conclusion  to  Seducing  Augustine,  MacKendrick  raises 
the question of praise in the following terms:  
 
Praise is not informational; indeed, its content may even 
in  a  way  be  tautological,  as  when  Augustine  in  those 
opening  lines  praises  God  as  being  worthy  of  praise. 
Praise is language in excess of meaning, or at any rate of 
denotation, and yet, for Augustine, it is the very deepest, 
and most important, meaning of language as well.
5 
 
Sordello refines, or rewrites, the Augustinian tautology—he would, I 
imagine,  be  surprised  to  hear  this—by  affirming  not  the 
praiseworthy ground of praise but, rather, mutual enfoldedness of 
praiser  and  praised,  too  much  and  enough.
6  If  praise,  in  the 
Augustinian  tradition,  is  “not  informational,”  in  the  Sordellian 
tradition  it  is  not  individual:  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  a  praise 
without interpenetration, without it becoming quite impossible to 
tell where you leave off, where I begin, and what the hell Milady of 
Foix is doing in the room. Between “pro” and “trop,” we trip over 
each other: what’s more, we call it good; we take this jumble and 
honor it (for our own honor or, as in line eight of Sordello’s poem, 
someone else’s). MacKendrick will go on to define praise as “the 
joy of speaking, and of writing; it is the joyful call in response to 
the call of joy.”
7 And this call, this response, is transforming; more 
precisely, it transfigures: for Augustine, in MacKendrick’s words, 
“the  transfiguration  of  the  humble  is  not  an  obliteration  of  it; 
weakness  does  not  become  power,  nor  humility  pride,  and  the 
eternal divine  in the passing flesh does not arrest  its  transience. 
Rather we are pulled toward oppositions we must both resist and 
embrace  .  .  .  ”
8  What  would  it  mean  to  think  transfiguration 
rhetorically—that is, to think the figures we cross, in the speech of 
others and in our own speech, our speech which is never, at least 
                                                                                                 
5  Karmen  MacKendrick,  “Seductive  Praises,”  in  Virginia  Burrus,  Mark 
Jordan, and Karmen MacKendrick, Seducing Augustine (NY: Fordham UP, 
2010), p. 119. 
6 This may be the place to acknowledge that Sarah Kay pointed out, in the 
questions following a panel at the 2009 meeting of the Modern Language 
Association, that enough and too much are effectively the same—or at least 
semantically contiguous—in most romance medieval vernaculars.  
7 MacKendrick, “Praises,” p. 120.  
8 MacKendrick, “Praises,” p. 118. GLOSSATOR 4 
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never properly, ours to own? What would it mean to praise these 
figures,  to  speak  them  in  and  as  praise?  And  can  we  elude  the 
coercion—the  threat  of  the  imperative—that  praise  so  often, 
implicitly or explicitly, brings with it? Can we praise things in the 
world (or their ineffable horizon) without arresting their transience, 
their ability—perhaps even  their tendency—to become  other than 
what they are? And can we praise in such a way that praise itself 
would not be immune to transformation—into, among other things, 
blame, love-language, academic discourse, song—while nonetheless 
remaining praise, resisting and embracing its constitutive work (or 
unworking) of affirmation?   
My  instinct  is  that  this  would  amount  to  recalibrating—or, 
again,  complicating—a  practice  of  affirmation  as,  instead  or  in 
addition, a practice of negation; that praise must unsay something, 
if  it  is  to  keep  from  smuggling  all  of  the  worst  kinds  of  gods 
(crucially,  not  transcendent  ones)  through  the  back  or  even  the 
front  door.  Praise,  in  this  way,  would  need  to  be  thought  (and 
performed)  apophatically  in  order  to  be  praise  at  all.  Luckily, 
Sordello has begun to gesture in this direction, perhaps in spite of 
himself, by enfolding praise and blame within one another, and his 
contemporary, Francis of Assisi, elsewhere says, and unsays, even 
more. Too much, even, or just enough: if a poetics of praise would 
be a poetics of the transfiguring (and transfigured) figure, the kinds 
of speech that give themselves over to something else, wrenched 
loose from themselves, unsaid and undone by their not-quite-object 
while  nonetheless  remaining  inviolate  (in  MacKendrick’s  words: 
not  obliterated),  then  here  is  how  that  fundamentally  apophatic 
practice  looks  in  the  Franciscan  canticle  of  the  creatures: 
“Altissimu, omnipotente, bonsignore, / tue sono le  laude” [Most 
high, all-powerful, good Lord / praise is yours].
9 The first lines of 
the canticle are a declaration of expropriation, of the extent to 
which poetry—since “laude” are praises but also, in fact, the lyric 
genre in which Francis is writing—does not belong to itself but is, 
instead,  aboriginally  “yours.”  This  “you,”  ordinary,  informal,  is 
also—paradoxically  and  paradigmatically—the  least  ordinary, 
literally the most high of all possible objects and owners of praise. 
And there’s no point in glossing over the ownership: this is a lord, 
if a  good one; this is a noble defined in relation to hierarchical 
position and power (if not, as with the lady of Foix, pleasure). But 
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slowly—or not even slowly—the hierarchy (God’s literal highness) 
becomes frayed, as it repeats itself in the first line of the second 
stanza: “ad te solo, Altissimo, se konfano / et nullu homo  enne 
dignu / te mentovare” [to you alone, Most High, do they conform / 
and no man is worthy / to mention you]. At first glance, it’s more 
of the same. The “you” this poem addresses is absolute, alone in 
some all-surpassing altitude; higher than any kite. Yet, alongside 
this assertion of God’s singular relationship to (and grounding of) 
praise,  something  else  is  happening.  No  one,  Francis’s  speaker 
affirms, is worthy to mention you. The question of praiseworthiness 
takes the unexpected form of asking not whether the object praised 
is worthy  of  praise but, instead, whether the subject of praise is 
worthy to praise. And Francis answers: no. There is no possible 
equivalence of praise to its object, pace Sordello, because there is 
no  subject  of  praise—strictly  speaking—capable  of  evaluation,  no 
subject  of  praise  whose  own  “valenza”  has  not  somehow  been 
called  radically  into  question,  set  against—alone—a  transcendent 
ground. When we praise, it is not that we are worthless; it is that 
our  worth—our  “valenza”—is  not  our  own.  When  we  praise—as 
when we love—we affirm the radical contingency of our selves, a 
contingency that somehow manages to speak itself most forcefully, 
most beautifully, in the practice of affirming someone or something 
else. Somehow we continue to mention you; somehow we continue 
to speak and sing and, even, praise; but not for a second are we 
entitled to this; not for a second does this speech—does anything—
belong to us. Our expropriation is such that we are nothing when 
we praise. 
 
 
4. CANSO 
 
What  would  happen  if  we  were  to  keep  this  emphasis  on  the 
unquestionable praiseworthiness of the object while, at the same 
time, extending its reach beyond superlatives, beyond the highest 
and the all-powerful? If my words do not belong to me, must they 
necessarily belong, instead, to you? Must their ground—and their 
object—be feudal, on the one hand, or parochial, on the other? Can 
we think a praise—a praise that would continue to call us radically 
into  question—directed  no  longer  necessarily  toward  a  lord  but 
toward something or someone with which or whom these words 
are made, “con-fatti,” complicated, mixed up? What would it mean GLOSSATOR 4 
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to think the conformity, the togetherness and the co-shaping, of the 
voice that praises and the object, the horizon, of that praise?  
The most famous line of the canticle, the first line of the third 
stanza,  proclaims,  “Laudato  sie,  mi  signore,  cum  tucte  le  tue 
creature”  [Praised  be  you,  my  lord,  with  all  your  creatures]. 
“Laudato sie,” the poem’s signature move, relinquishes its hold on 
the praise it offers: “may you be praised” is, after all, as different 
from “I will praise you” or “Praise him” as it is from “may it not 
please her” (à la Sordello): from the former because there is no 
guarantee that the praise will happen, much less that it will reach 
its  destination;  from  the  latter  because  what  is  wished  for, 
suspended, left hanging is not an interdiction but a recognition, not 
a  no  but  a  yes.  Furthermore,  this  gamble  in  your  direction—the 
thrown subjunctive, the wish and the exhortation—is also, strangely, 
beautifully,  bound  up  with  the  ties  that  bind  creatures  to  one 
another and to you, even as the poem’s initial expropriation—these 
praises are not my own—gives way to a paradoxical assertion that 
the  lord  is  nonetheless  (and  pace  Brandy  and  Monica  this  time) 
mine.  If  we  hear  that  “mine”  in  the  most  radical  sense—as 
necessarily  co-implicated  with  the  “you”  who  structures  and 
enables the very language of the poem—something explodes inside 
ownership.  You  are  mine.  You  are  a  minefield.  And  that  small 
explosion—I can’t help wondering—must have something to do with 
how I am bound up not just with you, whoever you are, but also 
with these bodies, human and inhuman, animate and otherwise, 
that are both near and distant from me. We are inextricable. I can’t 
praise you enough.
10 
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10  My  thanks—and  praise—to  the  audiences  in  Kalamazoo  (at  the  2009 
BABEL-sponsored panel on pleasure in medieval studies) and New York 
(at the Colloquium for Early Literature and Culture in English at New 
York University in February 2010) for their engagement, dialogue, and 
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